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Abstract
A block cipher is a bijective function that transforms a plaintext to a ciphertext. A block cipher is a principle
component in a cryptosystem because the security of a cryptosystem depends on the security of a block
cipher. A Feistel network is the most widely used method to construct a block cipher. This structure has a
property such that it can transform a function to a bijective function. But the previous Feistel network is un-
suitable to construct block ciphers that have large input-output size. One way to construct block ciphers with
large input-output size is to use an unbalanced Feistel network that is the generalization of a previous Feistel
network. There have been little research on unbalanced Feistel networks and previous work was about some
particular structures of unbalanced Feistel networks. So previous work didn’t provide a theoretical base to
construct block ciphers that are secure and efficient using unbalanced Feistel networks.
In this thesis, we analyze the minimal number of rounds of pseudo-random permutation generators
that use unbalanced Feistel networks. That is, after categorizing unbalanced Feistel networks as source-
heavy structures and target-heavy structures, we analyze the minimal number of rounds of pseudo-random
permutation generators that use each structure. Therefore, in order to construct a block cipher that is secure
and efficient using unbalanced Feistel networks, we should follow the results of this thesis. Additionally, we
propose a new unbalanced Feistel network that has some advantages such that it can extend a previous block
cipher with small input-output size to a new block cipher with large input-output size. We also analyze the
minimum number of rounds of a pseudo-random permutation generator that uses this structure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A block cipher is a symmetric key cryptosystem that encrypts a plaintext into a ciphertext block by block
[20]. The block cipher should have the one-to-one correspondence between plaintexts and ciphertexts. The
block cipher is the most important element in most cryptographic systems. In particular, it is the essen-
tial element used in the implementation of other cryptographic primitives such as pseudo-random number
generators, stream ciphers, and hash functions [20, 33]. Since the security of most cryptographic systems
depends on the security of block ciphers, a secure block cipher must be implemented to build a secure cryp-
tosystem. A secure block cipher is a block cipher where the output value of the block cipher becomes a
random value. That is, when the output value of the block cipher is random, the block cipher becomes a
secure one since it is very hard for an attacker to guess the plaintext or the secret key of the cipher from
the ciphertext. Mathematically, a block cipher is a secure block cipher if it is a pseudo-random permutation
(PRP) generator [16].
The biggest problem of implementing a block cipher is that it is difficult to implement a function that has
the one-to-one correspondence property and the output randomness property at the same time. The way to
solve this problem is to use a Feistel network structure. A Feistel network structure is a method that converts
an arbitrary function into a one-to-one correspondence function. This structure was designed by H. Feistel
in designing the Lucifer cipher [8, 9]. That is, if a block cipher is implemented using a Feistel network, a
secure block cipher can be easily implemented by simply implementing an arbitrary function whose output
value is random. This is because if the output value of an arbitrary function is random, the Feistel network
structure automatically converts it to a one-to-one correspondence function.
Therefore, most block ciphers are constructed by using a Feistel network structure or a slightly modified
structure of the Feistel network structure [23, 29, 33, 38]. In addition, some research has been done on the
security of block ciphers using the Feistel network structure [3, 18, 20, 32]. In particular, there have been
numerous studies on pseudo-random permutation generators after the work of Luby and Rackoff [1, 7, 16,
25–28, 31, 32, 36, 40]. However, the problem of the previous (balanced) Feistel network is that it is difficult
to construct a block cipher with a large input/output size. That is, when a block cipher that can process a
large size of data at one time is implemented, the input size of a round function used in the Feistel network
structure also increases as the input/output size of the block cipher increases. In practice, however, the cost
of implementing a round function is proportional to the input size of the round function. Therefore, the
previous (balanced) Feistel network structure is inappropriate when constructing a block cipher with large
input/output size.
One of the ways to solve this problem is to use an unbalanced Feistel network structure which is a
modification of the previous balanced Feistel network. An unbalanced Feistel network is a Feistel network
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structure in which the size of a target-block combined with the output of a round function and the size of a
source-block which is the input of the round function are different [2,17,35]. Therefore, the round function
in an unbalanced Feistel network structure can be implemented at a lower cost than a balanced Feistel
network since it is possible to control the input size of the round function in the unbalanced Feistel network
structure. Especially, as the information processing capability of the computer increases, a block cipher
with a large input-output size that is capable of processing a large amount of information will be needed.
Therefore, much research is needed on unbalanced Feistel networks suitable for implementing block ciphers
with large input-output size. However, there are not many studies on unbalanced Feistel networks.
There are some studies to implement a pseudo-random permutation generator, which is a secure block
cipher using an unbalanced Feistel network [14, 21]. However, these studies failed to show the minimum
number of rounds for a block cipher using an unbalanced Feistel network to become a secure and efficient
block cipher. In fact, the minimum number of rounds is important when constructing a block cipher because
the number of rounds greatly affects the speed and cost of the block cipher. That is, when constructing a
block cipher, a small number of rounds must be used to implement a fast block cipher at low cost. It is
therefore very important to determine the minimum number of rounds to be a secure block cipher.
Therefore, in this thesis, we first find the minimum number of rounds for a pseudo-random permuta-
tion generator, which is a secure block cipher using a Feistel network. Next, we propose a scalable new
unbalanced Feistel network structure and find the minimum number of rounds for this structure to become
a secure block cipher. The advantage of a newly proposed structure is that it can easily construct a block
cipher with a large input-output size using a previously designed secure block cipher with fixed input-output
size. In other words, there is a lot of analysis and research on a new block cipher in order to newly design a
block cipher with a large input-output size. However, by using this newly proposed structure, a new block
cipher with a large input-output size can be implemented using the previously analyzed secure block cipher.
So we do not have to do another analysis and research.
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we first define a block cipher, a Feistel network,
and a pseudo-random number generator. Then we summarize the existing studies on pseudo-random permu-
tation generators. In Chapter 3, we investigate the condition of the number of rounds for a block cipher using
an unbalanced Feistel network to be a pseudo-random permutation generator. In Chapter 4, we propose a
scalable unbalanced Feistel network structure, and analyze the conditions for a secure block cipher using
this new structure to be a pseudo-random permutation generator. In Chapter 5, we compare a balanced Feis-
tel network structure, an unbalanced Feistel network structure, and the newly proposed structure. Finally, in
Chapter 6, we conclude the thesis and present the direction of future research.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we define the terms used in the thesis and summarize the studies related to a pseudo-random
permutation generator. A block cipher is a secret-key cryptosystem that processes messages using the same
key when encrypting and decrypting messages. A block cipher is the basis of cryptographic systems for
message authentication, data integrity verification, and digital signature. Mathematically, a block cipher is a
one-to-one function (permutation) since it must be able to encrypt and decrypt messages using a secret key.
A Feistel network structure is most commonly used to build block ciphers because it has the advantage of
converting arbitrary functions to permutations. In order for a block cipher to be a secure block cipher, the
output value of the block cipher must be a random value. That is, when a block cipher becomes a pseudo-
random permutation generator, it becomes a secure block cipher. In this case, the permutation generator P
is pseudo-random, meaning that any efficient algorithm can not distinguish between an ideal permutation
generator and P.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we first define symbols used in this paper. In
Section 2.2, we define a block cipher, which is a secret-key cryptosystem, and investigate the characteristics
of the block cipher and attack methods for block ciphers. In Section 2.3, we define the most commonly
used Feistel networks for building block ciphers and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of them. In
Section 2.4, we define the pseudorandomness. In Section 2.5, we finally summarize existing studies on
pseudo-random permutation generators
2.1 Notation
The symbols used in this paper are defined as follows.
• In represents a set of all n-bit strings. That is, {0,1}n.
• F : Is→ It is a set of all functions whose inputs are s-bits and whose outputs are t-bits.
• Fn is a set of functions whose input and output are both n-bits in size. That is, Fn is F : In→ In.
• Pn is a set of permutations (one-to-one functions) whose input and output sizes are both n-bits. That
is, Pn ⊂ Fn
• |x| is the length of a bit string x. That is, |x| is n if the bit size of x is n-bits.
• x⊕ y is an exclusive OR (XOR) per bit unit when the bit size of x and y is equal.
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Figure 2.1: The overview of a secret-key cryptosystem
• x‖y is a concatenation of two bit strings x and y. In this case, we have |x‖y|= |x|+ |y|.
• f ◦ g is the composition of two functions f and g when f and g are elements of the set Fn. That is,
f ◦g(x) = f (g(x)).
2.2 Block Cipher
A block cipher can usually be a private-key cryptosystem or a public-key cryptosystem. However, in this
paper, the secret-key cryptosystem is called a block cipher. The structure of a block cipher is given in Figure
2.1.
A block cipher is a function that sends an n-bit plaintext to an n-bit ciphertext [20, 37]. The function
of the block cipher is specified by an `-bit secret key. If a plaintext is encrypted and decrypted again, the
original plaintext must be obtained. Therefore, the block cipher must be a one-to-one function (bijection)
for n-bit plaintexts and n-bit ciphertexts when a secret key is specified. That is, each secret key defines a
different permutation. The definition of the block cipher is as follows.
Definition 2.2.1 (Block Cipher). Let K be the set of `-bit secret keys. The n-bit block cipher is defined as a
function E : In×K→ In. We have that E−1(E(p,k),k) = p holds for an arbitrary plaintext p and a random
key k (k ∈ K).
A true random block cipher is a block cipher that generates all permutations between the domain and
the range [20]. In the n-bit block cipher, the domain corresponds to the set of plaintexts and the number
of plaintexts is 2n, so the size of the domain is 2n. The range corresponds to the set of ciphertexts and the
number of ciphertexts is 2n, so the size of the range is also 2n. Therefore, the number of all permutations
is 2n!. In the n-bit block cipher, one key specifies one permutation, so we need 2n! number of secret
keys to enumerate all permutations. That is, the size of a secret key of the ideal block cipher must be
log(2n!)≈ (n−1.44)2n bits.
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Definition 2.2.2 (Ideal Block Cipher). An ideal block cipher is a block cipher that implements all 2n! number
of one-to-one functions that exist between 2n number of elements. In this case, each secret key specifies
each one-to-one function.
It is impossible to actually build an ideal block cipher because it requires (n−1.44)2n bits for a secret
key. Thus, in order for a block cipher using an `-bit secret key to be secure, the permutations that are
specified by `-bit secret keys must appear randomly chosen from all 2n! permutations.
The security of a block cipher is measured by the security against the various attack methods of attackers.
The attack on the block cipher is divided into four categories according to the information that the attacker
can access:
1. Ciphertext-only attack: The attacker uses only ciphertexts to get the secret key of the block cipher.
2. Known-plaintext attack: The attacker uses known plaintexts and ciphertexts pairs to find the secret
key of the block cipher.
3. Chosen-plaintext attack: The attacker finds the secret key of the block cipher by using the pairs of
plaintexts and corresponding ciphertexts chosen by the attacker.
4. Chosen-ciphertext attack: The attacker finds the secret key using the chosen ciphertexts and its corre-
sponding plaintexts.
Differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis are the most powerful methods of attacking block
ciphers. Differential cryptanalysis is a chosen-plaintext attack developed by Biham and Shamir [3]. This
attack method exploits the fact that the probability distribution of the difference between the input/output
pair of a nonlinear function is not uniform. Linear cryptanalysis is a known-plaintext attack developed by
Matsui [18]. This attack method extracts the information of a related key by using a linear approximation of
a nonlinear function.
2.3 Feistel Network
A Feistel network is the most commonly used structure for designing a block cipher. This structure was first
used when designing a Lucifer cipher by H. Feistel [8, 9]. After that, this was used to design block ciphers
such as DES, FEAL, Blowfish, and RC5 [23, 29, 33, 38].
A Feistel network is a method that converts an arbitrary function to a permutation that is a one-to-one
correspondence function. The definition of a Feistel network is as follows.
Definition 2.3.1 (Feistel Network). For any function f belonging to F : Is→ It , one round Feistel network
is defined as a function D f (L‖R) = (R‖L⊕ f (R)). Similarly, for the functions f1, f2, . . . , fr, which belong
to the set F : Is → It , an r rounds Feistel network is defined as a function D fr ◦ · · · ◦D f2 ◦D f1(L‖R)
de f
=
D fr ◦ · · · ◦D f2(D f1(L‖R)), where |L|= t, |R|= s, |L|+ |R|= n, and D f ∈ Pn.
The above Feistel network can be seen as a permutation. To show that a function is a one-to-one cor-
respondence function (bijection), we should show that it is a one-to-one function and an onto function.
However, we only need to show that it is a one-to-one function since the input and output bits of the Feistel
network are the same.
Theorem 2.3.1. The function D f (L‖R) = (R‖L⊕ f (R)) is a one-to-one function.
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Figure 2.2: Feistel networks: (a) Balanced Feistel network, (b) Unbalanced Feistel network
Proof. If the function D f is a one-to-one function, then D f (x) 6= D f (y) for x and y such that x 6= y. If
x = (L1‖R1) and y = (L2‖R2), then D f (x) = (R1‖L1⊕ f (R1)) and D f (y) = (R2‖L2⊕ f (R2)). Because of
x 6= y, we consider two cases.
• Case R1 6= R2: D f (x) 6= D f (y) by the definition of D f .
• Case L1 6= L2 and R1 = R2: L1⊕ f (R1) 6= L2⊕ f (R2) since f (R1) = f (R2).
So the function is a one-to-one function.
A Feistel network is divided into a balanced Feistel network and an unbalanced Feistel network [35]. A
balanced Feistel network is a Feistel network in Definition 2.3.1 with the same L and R sizes. In contrast, an
unbalanced Feistel network is a Feistel network in Definition 2.3.1 with different L and R sizes (|L| 6= |R|).
The balanced Feistel network and unbalanced Feistel network structures are given in Figure 2.2.
The DES algorithm that uses a Feistel network was invented in 1970s and it has been used as the standard
block cipher for 20 years [23]. Many researchers have studied the security of the DES algorithm [3, 18, 34].
In addition, many other block ciphers that were invented after DES were also affected by the DES cipher.
Example 1 (DES). The DES algorithm is a 64-bit block cipher with a 56-bit secret key. This cipher has a
16 rounds balanced Feistel network structure. The ith round is defined as
DKi(L
i−1‖Ri−1) de f= (Ri−1‖Li−1⊕P(S(E(R)⊕Ki)))
where |Li−1| = |Ri−1| = 32, |Ki| = 48, E : I32→ I48 is an expansion function, S : I48→ I32 is a substitution
function, and P : I32→ I32 is a permutation function.
An unbalanced Feistel network is divided into a source-heavy unbalanced Feistel network and a target-
heavy unbalanced Feistel network [35]. The source-heavy unbalanced Feistel network is a Feistel network
where the size of the block R which is the input to the F function, is greater than the size of the block L
which is combined with the output of the F function (|R|> |L|). Whereas the target-heavy Feistel network
is a Feistel network where the size of the block R is smaller than the size of the block L (|R| < |L|). The
structures of source-heavy and target-heavy Feistel networks are given in Figure 2.3.
The MARS algorithm is a block cipher proposed for the advanced encryption standard (AES) to replace
the DES block cipher [6]. This cipher uses a target-heavy unbalanced Feistel network.
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Figure 2.3: Unbalanced Feistel networks: (a) Source-heavy Feistel network, (b) Target-heavy Feistel net-
work
Example 2 (MARS). The MARS algorithm is a 128-bit block cipher proposed for AES and it can have
different size of secret keys. This cipher has a 32 rounds unbalanced Feistel network. The ith round is
defined as
DKi(L
i−1
1 ‖Li−12 ‖Li−13 ‖Ri−1)
de f
= (Ri−1‖Li−11  f i1(Ri−1)‖Li−12  f i2(Ri−1)‖Li−13  f i3(Ri−1))
where  is the addition operator in mod 232.
The main advantage of a block cipher using an unbalanced Feistel network is that it can select the input
size of the F function used in the Feistel network. In particular, as the amount of data that the computer has
to process due to the development of the Internet, the amount of messages to be encrypted is also increasing.
As the information throughput increases, an encryption scheme that can process large amounts of data
becomes necessary. Therefore, a block cipher with a large input size is needed. The advanced encryption
standard (AES) selected by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) also requires a 128-bit
block cipher to reflect this demand [22].
When implementing a block cipher with a large input value, it is difficult to implement the F function
of a Feistel network if a balanced Feistel network is used. This is because the cost of implementing the
F function is generally proportional to the size of the input value of the F function. However, since the
input size of the F function can be selected in an unbalanced Feistel network, it is very effective to use an
unbalanced Feistel network in implementing a large block cipher. In other words, a block cipher with a large
input size using a target-heavy unbalanced Feistel network can be implemented at a lower cost than a cipher
using other Feistel network structures.
2.4 Pseudo-Randomness
Before defining pseudo-randomness, we first review what two distributions are computationally equivalent.
The computational equivalence of two distributions means that no effective algorithm can determine that
two distributions are different. In other words, computational indistinguishability is a criterion for judging
the equivalence of two distributions. Therefore, the pseudo-randomness distribution is a distribution that
can not be distinguished from the truly random distribution by computation [11].
At this time, it is necessary to define an algorithm for determining whether two distributions are identical.
The definition of an algorithm for determining identical distributions is defined by the following oracle
machine.
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Definition 2.4.1 (Oracle Machine M). An oracle machine M is a Turing machine that has an oracle tape as
an additional tape and has two special states called “oracle invocation” and “oracle appeared”. The oracle
machine has an input value of 1n and an output value of 1. The oracle machine that can access a function f
whose input value is n bits in size is called M f (1n) and operates as follows: If the state of the oracle machine
is not “oracle appeared”, then it operates as the same as a normal Turing machine. If the state of the oracle
machine is “oracle origin”, then the oracle machine writes an oracle query x1 which is n bits string to the
oracle tape. Then, the state of the oracle machine is changed to “oracle appeared”, and the content of the
oracle tape is replaced by the oracle reply y1 = f (x1). This process repeats m times. The 1-bit output of the
oracle machine is calculated from the values < x1,y1 >,< x2,y2 >,. . . ,< xm,ym >.
Because the oracle machine determines the equality of the two distributions, the pseudo-randomness
is determined by the computational power of the oracle machine. An effective algorithm for determining
the equality of two distributions is an oracle machine that calculates the output value within a probabilistic
polynomial-time. Thus, the pseudo-random distribution refer to a distribution that can not be distinguished
from the true random distribution using probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machines. At this time, the
indistinguishability is defined as the following.
Definition 2.4.2 (Polynomial-Time Indistinguishability). If two distributions X and Y are indistinguishable
in polynomial-time, then the following equation holds for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms D,
all polynomials p(·), and sufficiently large n values
|Pr(D(X ,1n) = 1)−Pr(D(Y,1n) = 1)|< 1/p(n)
where the output of algorithm D is 1 bit.
A cryptographically secure pseudo-random bit generator was first introduced by Blum and Micali [5].
After that, a number of pseudo-random bit generators have been proposed based on number theoretic prob-
lems [4, 15, 39]. Ha˚stard et al. have shown that a pseudo-random bit generator can be constructed using an
arbitrary one-way function [13]. A pseudo random bit generator is defined as follows. In this case, an ideal
random bit generator R has a uniform distribution of all possible output values.
Definition 2.4.3 (Pseudo-Random Bit Generator). A pseudo-random bit generator is defined by a determin-
istic polynomial-time algorithm G and satisfies the following two conditions:
1. Scalability: |G(s)|> |s| for all s ∈ {0,1}∗.
2. Pseudo-Randomness: The algorithm G is indistinguishable from the ideal random bit generator R in
polynomial time.
Blum and Micali showed that it is possible to construct a pseudo-random bit generator using the difficul-
ties of the discrete logarithm problem [5]. The pseudo-random bit generator of Blum and Micali is described
in Example 3.
Example 3 (Blum-Micali Pseudo-Random Bit Generator). Let p be a large prime, and g be a generator
of Z∗p. The set D is defined as D = Z∗p = 0,1, . . . , p−1. The function f : D→ D is defined as f (x) = gx
mod p. The function B : D→ {0,1} is defined as B(x) = 1 for 0 ≤ logg(x) ≤ (p− 1)/2 and B(x) = 0 for
logg(x)> (p−1)/2. The Blum-Micali pseudo-random bit generation algorithm is described as follows.
generate a large prime p and a generator g of Z∗p.
select a random integer x0 from D = {0,1, . . . , p−1}.
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for 1≤ i≤ ` do
xi← f (xi−1).
bi← B(xi).
end for
output b1,b2, . . . ,b`.
Blum, Blum, and Shub showed that it is possible to construct a pseudo-random bit generator using the
difficulties of the quadratic residuacity problem [4]. The pseudo-random bit generator of Blum, Blum, and
Shub is described in Example 4.
Example 4 (Blum-Blum-Shub Pseudo-Random Bit Generator). Let LSB(x) be a function that outputs the
least significant bit of a binary string x. The Blum-Blum-Shub pseudo-random bit generation algorithm is
described as follows.
generate a large prime p such that p mod 4 = 3.
generate a large prime q such that q mod 4 = 3.
n← pq.
select a random integer s ∈ {1, . . . ,n−1} such that gcd(s,n) = 1.
x0← s2 mod n.
for 1≤ i≤ ` do
xi← x2i−1 mod n.
bi← LSB(xi).
end for
output b1,b2, . . . ,b`.
A pseudo-random function generator is a function generator that is indistinguishable from an ideal ran-
dom function generator H that generates all possible functions with a uniform probability distribution. Gol-
dreich, Goldwasser, and Micali showed that a pseudo-random bit generator can be used to create a pseudo-
random function generator [12]. A pseudo-random function generator is defined as follows.
Definition 2.4.4 (Pseudo-Random Function Generator). A pseudo-random function generator is defined
as an algorithm F that generates a set of functions. For all probabilistic polynomial-time oracle M, all
polynomials p(·), and sufficiently large n values, it satisfies
|Pr(MF(1n) = 1)−Pr(MH(1n) = 1)|< 1/p(n)
where H is an ideal random function generator that generates all possible functions as a uniform probability
distribution.
Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali proposed a pseudo-random function generator as follows.
Example 5 (GGM Pseudo-Random Function Generator). Let G be a pseudo random bit generator whose
input is k bits and whose output is 2k bits. That is, G(x) = bx1b
x
2 · · ·bx2k for the initial value x ∈ Ik. Let G0(x)
be the first k bit string of G(x) and G1(x) be the remaining k bit string of G(x). That is, G0(x) = bx1 · · ·bxk and
G1(x) = bxk+1 · · ·bx2k. For a t-bit binary string α = α1α2 · · ·αt , Gα(x) is defined as Gαt (· · ·(Gα2(Gα1(x)))).
For a given x ∈ Ik, a pseudo-random function fx : Ik→ Ik is defined as
fx(y)
de f
= Gy(x)
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where y ∈ Ik. For polynomials P1 and P2 and given x ∈ Ik, a pseudo-random function F : IP1(k) → lP2(k) is
defined as
Fx(y)
de f
= G′(Gy(x))
where y ∈ IP1(k) and G′ is a pseudo-random bit generator with k bits input and P2(k) bits output.
Let us look at the performance of the GGM pseudo-random function generator. A pseudo-random
function generator Fx : IP1(k) → IP2(k) must generate a pseudo-random string of approximately P1(k) · 2k+
P2(k) bits. Assuming that the size k of the string x is properly selected and that P2(k) is not a value much
larger than P1(k), then the size of pseudo-random bits that the pseudo-random function Fx must generate
is proportional to the input bit size P1(k). So the smaller the input bit size of the function, the faster the
function can be generated.
A pseudo-random permutation generator was introduced by Luby and Rackoff [16]. The definition of
pseudo-random permutation generator is given as follows.
Definition 2.4.5 (Pseudo-Random Permutation Generator). A pseudo-random permutation generator is de-
fined as an algorithm P which generates a set of permutations. For all probabilistic polynomial-time oracle
M, all polynomials p(·), and sufficiently large n values, it satisfies the following equation
|Pr(MP(1n) = 1)−Pr(MH(1n) = 1)|< 1/p(n)
where H is an ideal random permutation generator that produces all possible permutations with a uniform
probability distribution.
Luby and Rackoff showed that a pseudo-random permutation generator could be constructed by using a
pseudo-random function and a three rounds balanced Feistel network structure.
Example 6. A three rounds balanced Feistel network that uses pseudo-random functions f1, f2, f3 is a
pseudo-random permutation generator and is defined as
D f3 ◦D f2 ◦D f1(L‖R)
de f
= D f3(D f2(D f1(L‖R)))
where D fi(L‖R) = (R‖L⊕ fi(R)) and |L|= |R|.
A super pseudo-random permutation generator is a permutation generator, which can not be distin-
guished from an ideal random permutation generator when an oracle machine is able to access both a per-
mutation and the inverse of the permutation. The definition is given as follows.
Definition 2.4.6 (Super Pseudo-Random Permutation Generator). A super pseudo-random permutation gen-
erator is defined as an algorithm P that generates the set of permutations. For all probabilistic polynomial-
time oracle M, all polynomials p(·), and the large n value, it satisfies the following equation
|Pr(MP,P−1(1n) = 1)−Pr(MH,H−1(1n) = 1)|< 1/p(n)|
where P−1 is the inverse of the permutation P, H is an ideal random permutation generator that produces a
permutation with a uniform probability distribution, and H−1 is the inverse of H.
Luby and Rackoff show that it is possible to build a super pseudo-random permutation generator by
using a pseudo-random function and a four rounds balanced Feistel network structure.
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Example 7. A four rounds balanced Feistel network that uses pseudo-random functions f1, f2, f3, f4 is a
super pseudo-random permutation generator and is defined as
D f4 ◦D f3 ◦D f2 ◦D f1(L‖R)
de f
= D f4(D f3(D f2(D f1(L‖R))))
where D fi(L‖R) = (R‖L⊕ fi(R)) and |L|= |R|.
If a block cipher is a pseudo-random permutation generator, then it becomes a secure block cipher for a
chosen-plaintext attack. If a block cipher is a super pseudo-random permutation generator, then it becomes
a secure block cipher for a chosen-plaintext attack and a chosen-ciphertext attack.
2.5 Pseudo-Random Permutation Generator
The research on pseudo-random permutation generators has been started by Luby and Rackoff. They have
proved that a three rounds balanced Feistel network that uses pseudo-random functions is a pseudo-random
permutation generator [16]. The proof of pseudo-random permutation is largely divided into two parts.
First, the proof show that a three rounds Feistel network that uses ideal random functions becomes a
pseudo-random permutation generator. Next, the proof show that that a three rounds Feistel network that
uses pseudo-random functions is pseudo-random by using contradiction. The proof that shows the pseudo-
randomness of the three rounds Feistel network that uses ideal random functions looks like this. First, we
define BAD as an event that a machine can distinguish a balanced Feistel permutation generator P from an
ideal permutation generator K. Next the proof show that P is the same as K if the BAD event does not occur,
and it also show that the probability of the BAD event is very low. To prove that a three rounds Feistel
network that uses pseudo-random functions is pseudo-random by using contradiction. In other words, if
the three rounds Feistel network that uses ideal random functions is pseudo-random, but the three rounds
Feistel network that uses pseudo-random functions is not pseudo-random, then it is possible to derive a
contradiction on the assumption that pseudo-random functions are pseudo-random.
There have been some studies to simply prove the pseudo-randomness of permutation generators since
the work of Luby and Rackoff. Maurer used a local random function instead of a pseudo-random function
to show that a three rounds Feistel network is a pseudo-random permutation generator [19]. Naor and
Reingold have proved that a three rounds structure that uses a pairwise independent permutation and a two
rounds Feistel network is pseudo-random [21].
After the work of Luby and Rackoff, much research focused to build pseudo-random permutation gen-
erators by using balanced Feistel networks and pseudo-random functions with small number of rounds.
That is, if we use pseudo-random functions with small number of rounds, then the size of keys used in
the permutation can be decreased since the size of keys for pseudo-random functions is large. Let f ,g,h,e
be pseudo-random functions, and f i be the composition of the function f with i times. The results are
summarized as follows.
• D f ◦D f ◦D f and D f ◦Dg ◦D f are not pseudo-random permutations [30].
• Dg ◦Dg ◦D f and Dg ◦D f ◦D f are not pseudo-random permutations [24, 41].
• Dg ◦Dg ◦D f ◦D f is not a super pseudo-random permutation [32].
• For all i, j,k ≥ 1, D f k ◦D f j ◦D f i is not a pseudo-random permutation [40].
• For all i, j,k, `≥ 1, D f ` ◦D f k ◦D f j ◦D f i is not a super pseudo-random permutation [32].
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Figure 2.4: Naor and Reingold’s PRP
• D f 2 ◦D f ◦D f ◦D f is a pseudo-random permutation [28].
• If I is an identity function, D f 2 ◦DI ◦D f ◦D f 2 ◦DI ◦D f is a super pseudo-random permutation [32].
• If ζ is a simple function like a shift operation, D f◦ζ◦ f ◦D f ◦D f ◦D f is a pseudo-random permutation
and D f◦ζ◦ f ◦D f ◦D f ◦D f ◦D f is a super pseudo-random permutation [25].
Although many studies are concerned with the use of a small number of pseudo-random functions,
reducing the size of the secret key using fewer pseudo-random functions is not a huge benefit. This is
because it is possible to increase a small key to a large key using a pseudo random bit generator.
Research to build pseudo-random permutation generators from unbalanced Feistel network structures
has only recently begun [14, 21]. Naor and Reingold showed that an unbalanced Feistel network with
total k+ 2 number of rounds is a pseudo-random permutation generator if it uses a pairwise independent
permutation in the first round, a source-heavy unbalanced Feistel network where the size of a source block
is k times larger than a target-block in the remaining rounds, and the F function of the Feistel network is a
pseudo-random function [21]. The pairwise independent permutation is defined as a permutation in which
the distribution of the function output values is uniform even if any two input values are selected. The
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Figure 2.5: Jutla’s PRP
pseudo-random permutation generator of Naor and Reingold is given in Figure 2.4 where k is two, h1 is a
pairwise independent of permutation, and f1, f2, and f3 are pseudo-random functions.
Jutla showed that an unbalanced Feistel network with total 2k+2 number of rounds is a pseudo-random
permutation generator if it uses a pseudo-random function for the F-function of the Feistel network, and
a target-heavy unbalanced Feistel network where a target-block size is larger than a source block by k
times [14]. At this time, the probability that an oracle machine that distinguishes between an ideal random
permutation generator and a 2k+ 2 rounds target-heavy unbalanced Feistel network is less than (mk/2kn).
The pseudo-random permutation generator of Jutla is given in Figure 2.5 where k is two and total rounds is
six.
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Chapter 3
Analysis of Unbalanced Feistel Networks
In this chapter, we analyze the conditions for permutation generators based on Feistel networks to be pseudo-
random. This chapter is summarized as follows. An unbalanced Feistel network is a Feistel network with
different sizes of source and target blocks. The unbalanced Feistel network is largely divided into a source-
heavy unbalanced Feistel network and a target-heavy unbalanced Feistel network. For a source-heavy un-
balanced Feistel network (kn:n-UFN) where a source block is k times larger than a target block, a k+ 2
rounds kn:n-UFN using pseudo-random functions is a pseudo-random permutation generator. For a target-
heavy unbalanced Feistel network (n:kn-UFN) where a target-block is k times larger than a source block, a
k+2 rounds n:kn-UFN using pseudo-random functions is a pseudo-random permutation generator. There-
fore, the minimum number of rounds for a unbalanced Feistel network using pseudo-random functions to
be pseudo-random is k+2 rounds.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.1, we divide unbalanced Feistel networks into two
categories. In Section 3.2, we overview the proof method to prove the pseudorandomness of an unbalanced
Feistel network. In Section 3.3, we analyze the conditions for a source-heavy unbalanced Feistel network to
be pseudo-random. In Section 3.4, we analyze the conditions for a target-heavy unbalanced Feistel network
to be pseudo-random.
3.1 Definition and Category
In a Feistel network, a block that is the input of a round function is called a source block, and a block that
is combined with the output of a round function is called a target block. An unbalanced Feistel network
is a Feistel network with different source and target block sizes. An unbalanced Feistel network with a
source-block size of s bits and a target block size of t bits is denoted as s:t-UFN.
An unbalanced Feistel network is largely classified as a source-heavy unbalanced Feistel network or
a target-heavy unbalanced Feistel network. A source-heavy unbalanced Feistel network is an unbalanced
Feistel network where the size of a source block is larger than that of a target block. The source-heavy
unbalanced Feistel network is denoted by kn:n-UFN and it is defined as follows. For instance, a 3 rounds
2n:n-UFN structure is described in Figure 3.1.
Definition 3.1.1 (kn:n-UFN). For any function f belonging to the set of functions F : Ikn→ In, one round
kn:n-UFN is defined by the following permutation
D f (L‖R1‖· · ·‖Rk) de f= (R1‖· · ·‖Rk‖L⊕ f (R1‖· · ·Rk)).
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Figure 3.1: The structure of a 3 rounds 2n:n-UFN
Similarly, for any functions f1, f2, . . . , fr belonging to the set of functions F : Ikn→ In, an r rounds kn:n-UFN
is defined by the following permutation
D fr ◦ · · · ◦D f2 ◦D f1(L0‖R01‖· · ·‖R0k)
de f
= D fr ◦ · · · ◦D f2(D f1(L0‖R01‖· · ·‖R0k)).
In this case, we have |L|= |Ri|= n.
A target-heavy unbalanced Feistel network is an unbalanced Feistel network where the size of a target
block is larger than that of a source block. The target-heavy unbalanced Feistel network is denoted by
n:kn-UFN and it is defined as follows. For instance, a 3 rounds n:2n-UFN structure is described in Figure
3.2.
Definition 3.1.2 (n:kn-UFN). For any function f belonging to the set of functions F : In→ Ikn, one round
n:kn-UFN is defined by the following permutation
D f (L1‖· · ·‖Lk‖R) de f= (R‖(L1‖· · ·‖Lk)⊕ f (R)) = (R‖L1⊕C1( f (R))‖· · ·‖Ck( f (R))).
In this case, the function C(·) satisfies C1( f (R))‖· · ·‖Ck( f (R))= f (R). Similarly, for any functions f1, f2, . . . , fr
belonging to the set of functions F : In→ Ikn, an r rounds n:kn-UFN is defined by the following permutation
D fr ◦ · · · ◦D f2 ◦D f1(L01‖· · ·‖L0k‖R0)
de f
= D fr ◦ · · · ◦D f2(D f1(L01‖· · ·‖L0k‖R0)).
In this case, we have |Li|= |R|= |Ci(·)|= n.
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Figure 3.2: The structure of a 3 rounds n:2n-UFN
3.2 Overview of the Pseudo-Random Proof
We first overview the way to prove that an r rounds unbalanced Feistel network using a pseudo-random
function generator is a pseudo-random permutation generator. The overall method is similar to the method
used by Luby and Rackoff [16].
First, we show that an r− 1 rounds unbalanced Feistel network is not a pseudo-random permutation
generator. For this, we show that there exists a linear relationship between the input and output values of the
r− 1 rounds unbalanced Feistel network. Then we use this linear relationship to build an oracle machine
that distinguishes between an ideal random permutation generator and the r− 1 rounds unbalanced Feistel
network permutation generator.
Next, we show that if an r rounds unbalanced Feistel network that uses ideal random functions is pseudo-
random, then an r rounds unbalanced Feistel network that uses pseudo-random functions is also pseudo-
random. This is because if the r rounds unbalanced Feistel network using ideal random functions is pseudo-
random but the r rounds unbalanced Feistel network using pseudo-random functions is not pseudo-random,
then it is possible to show an contradiction that the pseudo-random function is pseudo-random.
The following is a proof strategy to showing that an r rounds unbalanced Feistel network using ideal
random functions is pseudo-random. We first define the case where the r rounds unbalanced Feistel network
is not a pseudo-random permutation generator as a BAD event. For the BAD event, we prove the following
two things.
1. If the BAD event does not occur, the output of the r rounds unbalanced Feistel network that uses ideal
random functions is uniform.
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2. The probability of the BAD event is very low.
By using these two things, we can prove that the r rounds Feistel network using ideal random functions is a
pseudo-random permutation generator.
3.3 The Pseudo-Random Proof of kn:n-UFN
The following theorem show that a kn:n-UFN is not pseudo-random if the number of rounds is less than or
equal to k+1.
Theorem 3.3.1. A k+1 rounds kn:n-UFN is not pseudo-random.
Proof. For the proof, we first show that there is a linear relationship between the input and output values of
the kn:n-UFN, and that this linear relationship can be used to create an oracle machine that can distinguish
between an ideal random permutation generator and the kn:n-UFN. From the definition of a kn:n-UFN, we
first obtains the following equation
Lk+1 = Rk1 = R
k−1
2 = · · ·= R1k = L0⊕ f (R1‖· · ·‖Rk).
We select two oracle queries xp = (L0p‖R0p,1‖· · ·‖R0p,k) and xq = (L0q‖R0q,1‖· · ·‖R)q,k) where p and q are
indexes of two oracle queries with 1 ≤ p < q ≤ m. Then, we have Lk+1p = L0p⊕ f1(R0p,1‖· · ·‖R0p,k) and
Lk+1q = L
0
q⊕ f1(R0q,1‖· · ·‖R0q,k). Therefore, if we choose two oracle queries xp and xq in which L0p and L0q are
only different, then we can derive the following relation
Lk+1p ⊕Lk+1q = L0p⊕L0q
since f1(R0p,1‖· · ·‖R0p,k) = f1(R0q,1‖· · ·‖R0q,k).
This linear relation can be used to build an oracle machine M that distinguishes between the kn:n-
UFN and an ideal random permutation generator. First, the oracle machine creates two oracle queries
xp and xq that differ only in L0 values and receives the responses < xp,yp >,< xq,yq >. If the equation
Lk+1p ⊕ Lk+1q = L0p⊕ L0q is satisfied from the responses of the queries, then the oracle machine outputs 1.
Otherwise, the oracle machine outputs 0. Thus, if the xp and xq values are generated by the kn:n-UFN, then
the output of the oracle machine is always 1. However, if the xp and xq values are generated by the ideal
random permutation generator, then the probability that the equation is satisfied is 1/2n. Therefore we have
the following equation∣∣Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1)−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n = 1)∣∣= 1−1/2n > 1/p(n)
where P is the kn:n-UFN and K is the ideal random permutation generator. From this equation, the k+ 1
rounds kn:n-UFN is not pseudo-random.
We now prove that a k+ 2 rounds kn:n-UFN permutation generator using pseudo-random functions is
pseudo-random. First, we define an event that can be used to distinguish a k+ 2 rounds kn:n-UFN using
ideal random functions from an ideal random permutation generator as the following BAD event.
Definition 3.3.1. (The BAD event ξ of a k+ 2 rounds kn:n-UFN) A random variable ξ i is defined as an
event in which Rip,1‖· · ·‖Rip,k and Riq,1‖· · ·‖Riq,k of two oracle queries with indexes p and q are equal where
1≤ p< q≤ m. The BAD event ξ is a random variable defined as ∨k+1i=1 ξ i.
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If an oracle machine is able to distinguish between a k + 2 rounds kn:n-UFN and an ideal random
permutation generator, then the BAD event must occur. This means that if the BAD event does not occur,
then the k+2 rounds kn:n-UFN is equal to the ideal random permutation generator. In the following lemma,
we prove it.
Lemma 3.3.2. A k+2 rounds kn:n-UFN permutation generator using an ideal random function generator
is equal to an ideal random permutation generator if the BAD event does not occur. That is, for all possible
σ1,σ2, . . . ,σm ∈ {0,1}(k+1)n, we have
Pr(∧mi=1(yi = σi)|¬ξ ) = 1/2(k+1)nm
where yi is the output of the k+2 rounds kn:n-UFN permutation generator.
Proof. From the definition of a k+2 rounds kn:n-UFN using ideal random functions, the reply yp of the pth
oracle machine query xp is described as
yp = (Lk+2p ‖Rk+2p,1 ‖· · ·‖Rk+2p,k )
= (L1p⊕h2(·)‖L2p⊕h3(·)‖· · ·‖Lk+1p ⊕hk+2(·))
where h1,h2, . . . ,hk+2 are functions generated by an ideal random function generator whose inputs are kn
bits and whose outputs are n bits, and the input values of hi(·) are (Ri−1p,1 ‖· · ·‖Ri−1p,k ). By the definition of the
BAD event ξ , we obtain the following equation
¬ξ = ∧k+1i=1¬ξ i = ∧k+1i=1 (Rip,1‖· · ·‖Rip,k 6= Riq,1‖· · ·‖Riq,k)
where p and q are the oracle indexes with 1≤ p< q≤ m.
Thus the output value of h becomes a value with uniform distribution since the input values of h2, . . . ,hk+2
are different for all oracle queries and h is a function generated by the ideal random function generator.
Therefore, the value of Li−1⊕hi(·) becomes a value with uniform distribution.
Lemma 3.3.3. The probability of the BAD event in a k+ 2 rounds kn:n-UFN permutation generator is
bounded by
Pr(ξ )≤ (k+1)m2/2n+1.
Proof. By the definition of the BAD event, we have ξ = ∨k+1i=1 ξ i. We first calculate the probability of each
event ξ i. A random variable ξ i represents an event that Rip,1‖· · ·‖Rip,k and Riq,1‖· · ·‖Riq,k are equal for the
indexes p and q of the oracle queries with 1 ≤ p < q ≤ m. By the definition of a kn:n-UFN structure, we
obtain the following equation
Ri1‖· · ·‖Rik−i‖Rik−i+1‖· · ·‖Rik
= R0i+1‖· · ·‖R0k‖L0⊕h1(·)‖· · ·‖Li−1⊕hi(·)
where each hi(·) is a function generated by an ideal random function generator.
Thus, the best choice for the event ξ i to occur is to select an oracle query with R0p, j = R0q, j for i+ 1 <
j < k. In this case, the probability of the event ξ i is Pr(ξ i) = mC2 · 1/2in. Therefore, we have Pr(ξ ) <
(k+1)m2/2n+1.
In Theorem 3.3.4, we prove that a k+ 2 rounds kn:n-UFN that uses ideal random functions is pseudo-
random from the above two lemmas, and we also prove that a k+ 2 rounds kn:n-UFN that uses pseudo-
random functions is also pseudo-random.
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Theorem 3.3.4. A k + 2 rounds kn:n-UFN permutation generator using pseudo-random functions is a
pseudo-random permutation generator.
Proof. From Lemma 3.3.2 and Lemma 3.3.3, we can show that a kn:n-UFN permutation generator P using
an ideal random function generator is a pseudo-random permutation generator. First, we have |Pr(MP(1(k+1)n)=
1|¬ξ )−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) = 1)|= 0 since P is the same as an ideal random permutation generator K when the
BAD event ξ does not occur by Lemma 3.3.2. We also have |Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1|ξ )−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) =
1)| ≤ 1 since the absolute value of the probability difference is less than 1. Therefore, we have the following
equation ∣∣Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1)−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) = 1)∣∣
=
∣∣Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1|ξ )−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) = 1)∣∣ ·Pr(ξ )+∣∣Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1|¬ξ )−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) = 1)∣∣ ·Pr(¬ξ )
≤ Pr(ξ )≤ (k+1)m2/2n+1.
We now show that a k+ 2 rounds kn:n-UFN permutation generator P using a pseudo-random function
generator is a pseudo-random permutation generator. For this, we use the proof by contradiction. That is, if a
k+2 rounds kn:n-UFN using an ideal random function generator is pseudo-random but a k+2 rounds kn:n-
UFN using a pseudo-random function generator is not pseudo-random, then we can derive a contradiction
to the pseudo-randomness of the pseudo-random function generator.
Suppose that a kn:n-UFN permutation generator P using a pseudo-random function generator is not
pseudo-random. Then there exists an oracle machine M which distinguishes an ideal random permutation
generator K and P with a probability greater than 1/nc for a constant c.
First, we let D fk+2 ◦ · · · ◦D fi+1 ◦Dhi ◦ · · · ◦Dh1(·) be a permutation generator in which an ideal random
function generator is used from the first round to the ith round and a pseudo-random function generator is
used from the i+1th round to the k+2th round in a kn:n-UFN permutation generator for i with 0≤ i≤ k+2.
Let pDi be the probability that an oracle machine that has access to this permutation generator will output 1.
That is,
pDi = Pr(M
D fk+2◦···◦D fi+1◦Dhi◦···◦Dh1 (1(k+1)n) = 1)
where fi+1, . . . , fk+2 are functions generated by a pseudo-random function generator and h1, . . . ,hi are func-
tions generated by an ideal random function generator. Let pK be the probability that an oracle machine that
has access to the ideal random permutation generator will output 1. Since we supposed that the k+2 rounds
kn:n-UFN using a pseudo-random function generator is not pseudo-random, we get the following equation
1/nc ≤ |pK− pD0 |
≤ |pK− pDk+2|+ |pDk+2− pDk+1|+ · · ·+ |pDi+1− pDi |+ · · ·+ |pD1 − pD0 |.
However, since the k+ 2 rounds kn:n-UFN using an ideal random function generator has been shown
to be a pseudo-random permutation generator, we have |PK−PDk+2| ≤ (k+1)m2/2n+1. Therefore, we have
|pDi+1− pDi | ≥ 1/(k+3)nc for some i. By using this, an oracle machine C that distinguishes an ideal random
function generator and a pseudo-random function generator with a probability higher than 1/(k+3)nc can
be constructed as follows.
In the oracle machine C, we first change the part of C that calculates the oracle query reply to D fk+2 ◦· · ·◦
D fi+1 ◦DX ◦Dhi−1 ◦ · · · ◦Dh1(·). In this case, X is a function whose input is kn bits and whose output is n bits.
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If X in C is a function generated by a pseudo-random function generator F , then we have pDi = Pr(C
F(1kn) =
1). On the other hand, if X in C is a function generated by an ideal random function generator H, then we
have pDi+1 = Pr(C
H(1kn) = 1). However, it is possible to distinguish the ideal random function generator
and the pseudo-random function generator with a probability greater than 1/(k+ 3)nc since |pDi+1− pDi | ≥
1/(k+3)nc. But this contradicts that the pseudo-random function generator is pseudo-random. Therefore,
the k+ 2 rounds kn:n-UFN using a pseudo-random function generator is a pseudo-random permutation
generator.
From Theorem 3.3.1 and Theorem 3.3.4, the minimum number of rounds of the kn:n-UFN permutation
generator using a pseudo-random function generator to be pseudo-random is k+2.
3.4 The Pseudo-Random Proof of n:kn-UFN
The following theorem show that a n:kn-UFN permutation generator is not pseudo-random if the number of
rounds is less than or equal to k+1.
Theorem 3.4.1. A k+1 rounds n:kn-UFN permutation generator is not pseudo-random.
Proof. From the definition of a n:kn-UFN, we obtain the following equation
Lk+11 = R
k = Lk−1k ⊕Ck( fk(Rk−1))
= Lk−2k−1⊕Ck−1( fk−1(Rk−2))⊕Ck( fk(Rk−1))
...
= L01
k⊕
i=1
Ci( fi(Ri−1)).
If we choose two oracle queries xp and xq in which L0p and L
0
q are only different, then we have R
i
p = R
i
q
for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ k− 1. Therefore, from the oracle responses < xp,yp >,< xq,yq >, we can derive the
following relation
Lk+1p,1 ⊕Lk+1q,1 = L0p,1⊕L0q,1.
By using this linear relation, we can build an oracle machine M that distinguishes between an n:kn-UFN
permutation generator and an ideal random permutation generator. First, the oracle machine creates two
oracle queries xp and xq that differ only in L01 values and receives oracle responses < xp,yp >,< xq,yq >. If
the equation Lk+1p,1 ⊕Lk+1q,1 = L0p,1⊕L0q,1 is satisfied from the responses of the queries, then the oracle machine
outputs 1. Otherwise, the oracle machine outputs 0. Thus, if the xp and xq values are generated by the n:kn-
UFN, then the output of the oracle machine is always 1. However, if the xp and xq values are generated by
the ideal random permutation generator, then the probability that the relation is satisfied is 1/2n. Therefore
we have the following equation∣∣Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1)−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n = 1)∣∣= 1−1/2n > 1/p(n)
where P is the n:kn-UFN and K is the ideal random permutation generator. Thus the k+1 rounds n:kn-UFN
permutation generator is not pseudo-random.
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We now prove that a k+ 2 rounds n:kn-UFN permutation generator using pseudo-random functions is
pseudo-random. First, we define an event that can be used to distinguish a k+ 2 rounds n:kn-UFN using
ideal random functions from an ideal random permutation generator as the following BAD event.
Definition 3.4.1. (The BAD event ξ of a k+ 2 rounds n:kn-UFN) A random variable ξ i is defined as an
event in which Rip and R
i
q of two oracle queries with indexes p and q are equal where 1 ≤ p < q ≤ m. The
BAD event ξ is a random variable defined as ∨k+1i=k ξ i.
Lemma 3.4.2. A k+2 rounds n:kn-UFN permutation generator using an ideal random function generator
is equal to an ideal random permutation generator if the BAD event does not occur. That is, for all possible
σ1,σ2, . . . ,σm ∈ {0,1}(k+1)n, we have
Pr(∧mi=1(yi = σi)|¬ξ ) = 1/2(k+1)nm
where yi is the output of the k+2 rounds n:kn-UFN permutation generator.
Proof. From the definition of a k+2 rounds n:kn-UFN, the reply yp of the pth oracle machine query xp is
described as
yp = (Lk+2p,1 ‖Lk+2p,2 ‖· · ·‖Lk+2p,k ‖Rk+2p )
= (Rk+1p ‖Lk+2p,2 ‖· · ·‖Lk+2p,k ‖Rk+2p )
= (Rk+1p ‖(Lk+1p,1 ‖· · ·‖Lk+1p,k−1‖Lk+1p,k )⊕hk+2(Rk+1p ))
= (Lkp,k⊕Ck(hk+1(Rkp))‖(Lk+1p,1 ‖· · ·‖Lk+1p,k−1‖Lk+1p,k )⊕hk+2(Rk+1p ))
where hk+1,hk+2 are functions generated by an ideal random function generator whose inputs are n bits and
whose outputs are kn bits.
By the definition of the BAD event ξ , we obtain the following equation
¬ξ = ∧k+1i=1¬ξ i = (Rkp 6= Rkq)∧ (Rk+1p 6= Rk+1q )
where q and p are the oracle indexes with 1 ≤ p < q ≤ m. Thus the output values of hk+1,hk+2 become
values with uniform distribution since the input values of hk+1,hk+2 are different for all oracle queries and
hk+1,hk+2 are functions generated by the ideal random function generator.
Lemma 3.4.3. The probability of the BAD event in a k+ 2 rounds n:kn-UFN permutation generator is
bounded by
Pr(ξ )≤ m2/2n.
Proof. For the proof, we should show that Pr(ξ k) ≤ m2/2n+1 and Pr(ξ k+1) ≤ m2/2n+1 since Pr(ξ ) =
Pr(ξ k)+Pr(ξ k+1) by the definition of the BAD event ξ .
First, we show that Pr(ξ k) ≤ m2/2n+1. By the definition of ξ k, we have Pr(ξ k) = Pr(Rkp = Rkq) for the
oracle query indexes p and q with 1≤ p< q≤ m. Thus we obtain the following equation
Pr(Rkp = R
k
q) =
{
Pr(Lk−1p,k ‖Rk−1p = Lk−1q,k ‖Rk−1q ) if Lk−1p,k ‖Rk−1p = Lk−1q,k ‖Rk−1q
1/2n otherwise.
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Similarly, we can obtain the following equation
Pr(Lip,i+1‖· · ·‖Rip = Liq,i+1‖· · ·‖Riq)
=
{
Pr(Li−1p,i ‖· · ·‖Ri−1p = Li−1q,i ‖· · ·‖Ri−1q ) if Li−1p,i ‖· · ·‖Ri−1p = Li−1q,i ‖· · ·‖Ri−1q
1/2(k+1−i)n otherwise
Since each oracle query should be different, we have Pr(L0p,1‖· · ·‖L0p,k‖R0p = L0q,1‖· · ·‖L0q,k‖R0q) = 0 for
oracle query indexes p and q with 1≤ p< q≤ m. Thus, we have
Pr(ξ k) = mC2 ·Pr(Rkp = Rkq) = mC2
(
1
2n
+ · · ·+ 1
2kn
)
≤ m
2
2n+1
.
By using similar approach, we have Pr(ξ k+1)≤m2/2n+1. Therefore, we obtain Pr(ξ )=Pr(ξ k)+Pr(ξ k+1)≤
m2/2n.
In Theorem 3.4.4, we prove that a k+ 2 rounds n:kn-UFN that uses ideal random functions is pseudo-
random from the above two lemmas, and we also prove that a k+ 2 rounds n:kn-UFN that uses pseudo-
random functions is also pseudo-random.
Theorem 3.4.4. A k+2 rounds n:kn-UFN permutation generator using a pseudo-random function generator
is a pseudo-random permutation generator.
Proof. From Lemma 3.4.2 and Lemma 3.4.3, we can show that an n:kn-UFN permutation generator P
that uses an ideal random function generator is a pseudo-random permutation generator. First, we have
|Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1|¬ξ )−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) = 1)| = 0 since P is the same as an ideal random permutation
generator K when the BAD event ξ does not occur by Lemma 3.4.2. We also have |Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1|ξ )−
Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) = 1)| ≤ 1 since the absolute value of the probability difference is less than 1. Therefore, we
have the following equation∣∣Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1)−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) = 1)∣∣
=
∣∣Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1|ξ )−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) = 1)∣∣ ·Pr(ξ )+∣∣Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1|¬ξ )−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) = 1)∣∣ ·Pr(¬ξ )
≤ Pr(ξ )≤ m2/2n.
We now show that a k+ 2 rounds n:kn-UFN permutation generator P using a pseudo-random function
generator is a pseudo-random permutation generator. For this, we use the proof by contradiction. That is, if a
k+2 rounds n:kn-UFN using an ideal random function generator is pseudo-random but a k+2 rounds n:kn-
UFN using a pseudo-random function generator is not pseudo-random, then we can derive a contradiction
to the pseudo-randomness of the pseudo-random function generator.
Suppose that an n:kn-UFN permutation generator P using a pseudo-random function generator is not
pseudo-random. Then there exists an oracle machine M which distinguishes an ideal random permutation
generator K and P with a probability greater than 1/nc for a constant c.
First, we let D fk+2 ◦ · · · ◦D fi+1 ◦Dhi ◦ · · · ◦Dh1(·) be a permutation generator in which an ideal random
function generator is used from the first round to the ith round and a pseudo-random function generator is
used from the i+ 1th round to the k+ 2th round in the n:kn-UFN permutation generator for i with 0 ≤ i ≤
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k+ 2. Let pDi be the probability that an oracle machine that has access to this permutation generator will
output 1. That is,
pDi = Pr(M
D fk+2◦···◦D fi+1◦Dhi◦···◦Dh1 (1(k+1)n) = 1)
where fi+1, . . . , fk+2 are functions generated by a pseudo-random function generator and h1, . . . ,hi are func-
tions generated by an ideal random function generator. Let pK be the probability that an oracle machine that
has access to the ideal random permutation generator will output 1. Since we supposed that the k+2 rounds
n:kn-UFN using a pseudo-random function generator is not pseudo-random, we get the following equation
1/nc ≤ |pK− pD0 |
≤ |pK− pDk+2|+ |pDk+2− pDk+1|+ · · ·+ |pDi+1− pDi |+ · · ·+ |pD1 − pD0 |.
However, since the k+2 rounds n:kn-UFN using an ideal random function generator has been shown to
be a pseudo-random permutation generator, we have |PK −PDk+2| ≤ m2/2n. Therefore, we have |pDi+1−
pDi | ≥ 1/(k + 3)nc for some i. By using this, an oracle machine C that distinguishes an ideal random
function generator and a pseudo-random function generator with a probability higher than 1/(k+3)nc can
be constructed as follows.
In the oracle machine C, we first change the part of C that calculates the oracle query reply to D fk+2 ◦
· · · ◦D fi+1 ◦DX ◦Dhi−1 ◦ · · · ◦Dh1(·). In this case, X is a function whose input is n bits and whose output
is kn bits. If X in C is a function generated by a pseudo-random function generator F , then we have
pDi = Pr(C
F(1kn) = 1). On the other hand, if X in C is a function generated by an ideal random function
generator H, then we have pDi+1 = Pr(C
H(1kn) = 1). However, it is possible to distinguish the ideal random
function generator and the pseudo-random function generator with a probability greater than 1/(k+ 3)nc
since |pDi+1− pDi | ≥ 1/(k+3)nc. But this contradicts that the pseudo-random function generator is pseudo-
random. Therefore, the k+ 2 rounds n:kn-UFN using the pseudo-random function generator is a pseudo-
random permutation generator.
From Theorem 3.4.1 and Theorem 3.4.4, the minimum number of rounds of the n:kn-UFN permutation
generator using a pseudo-random function generator to be pseudo-random is k+2.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of Modified Unbalanced Feistel
Networks
In this section, we propose an unbalanced Feistel network structure that can extend an n-bit block cipher
to a (k+ 1)n-bit block cipher. Then we analyze the conditions for this modified Feistel structure to be
pseudo-random. This chapter is summarized as follows.
An n:kn-UFN2 structure, which can extend an n-bit block cipher to a (k+ 1)n-bit block cipher, is a
target-heavy unbalanced Feistel network where both the input and output of round functions are n bits. The
main advantage of the n:kn-UFN2 structure is that it allows to build a new block cipher with large input size
by using an existing block cipher with proven security. In order for an n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator
that uses pseudo-random functions to be pseudo-random, the round number k must be odd and the total
number of rounds must be at least 2k+1.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.1, we define an n:kn-UFN2 structure and exam-
ines the properties of this structure. In Section 4.2, we analyze the conditions for the n:kn-UFN2 structure
to be a pseudo-random permutation generator.
4.1 Definition and Property
As the information throughput increases, a block cipher with a large input is needed to process large amounts
of data. In general, however, it is not easy to build a block cipher with a large input. It is also difficult to
ensure the security of this new block cipher. However, if we can use a block cipher that is as secure as DES,
we can trust the security of the new cipher. However, the DES cipher does not expand to a block cipher
with a larger input because the input is fixed at 64 bits. Therefore, we propose an n:kn-UFN2 permutation
generator that can extend an n-bit block cipher to a (k+1)n-bit block cipher. We also analyze the condition
for this structure to be a pseudo-random permutation generator.
An n:kn-UFN2 structure is a target-heavy unbalanced Feistel network in which the input and output of
round functions are n bits. It is defined as follows. For instance, a 3 rounds n:2n-UFN2 structure is described
in Figure 4.1.
Definition 4.1.1 (n:kn-UFN2). For any function f belonging to the set of functions F : In→ In, one round
of n:kn-UFN2 is defined by the following permutation
D f (L1‖· · ·‖Lk‖R) de f= (R‖L1⊕ f (R)‖· · ·‖Lk⊕ f (R)).
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Figure 4.1: The structure of a 3 rounds n:2n-UFN2
Similarly, for any functions f1, f2, . . . , fr belonging to the set of functions F : In→ In, an r rounds n:kn-UFN2
is defined by the following permutation
D fr ◦ · · · ◦D f2 ◦D f1(L01‖· · ·‖L0k‖R0)
de f
= D fr ◦ · · · ◦D f2(D f1(L01‖· · ·‖L0k‖R0)).
In this case, we have |Li|= |R|= n.
4.2 The Pseudo-Random Proof of n:kn-UFN2
In Theorem 4.2.1, we show that an n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator is not pseudo-random if k is even. In
Theorem 4.2.2, we show that an n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator is not pseudo-random if k is odd and the
number of rounds is less than or equal to 2k.
Theorem 4.2.1. If k is even, then an n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator is not pseudo-random.
Proof. If k is even, then we obtain the following equation
Lr1⊕Lr2⊕·· ·⊕Lrk⊕Rr
(a)
= Rr−1⊕ (Lr−11 ⊕ fr(Rr−1))⊕·· ·⊕ (Lr−1k ⊕ fr(Rr−1))
(b)
= Lr−11 ⊕Lr−12 ⊕·· ·Lr−1k ⊕Rr−1
...
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(c)
= L01⊕L02⊕·· ·L0k⊕R0.
In this equation, (a) is satisfied from the definition of an n:kn-UFN2, (b) is satisfied from the property of ⊕
and the number of f is even, and (c) is satisfied from the recursive application of the above equation.
We can build an oracle machine M that distinguishes between an n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator and
an ideal random permutation generator. First, the oracle machine queries x = (L01‖· · ·‖L0k‖R0) and receives
a response y = (Lr1‖· · ·‖Lrk‖Rr). If the equation L01⊕ ·· ·L0k ⊕R0 = Lr1⊕ ·· ·⊕Lrk⊕Rr is satisfied, then the
oracle machine outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0. Thus, if the oracle response is generated by the n:kn-
UFN2, then the output of the oracle machine is always 1. However, if the oracle response is generated by the
ideal random permutation generator, then the probability that the equation is satisfied is 1/2n. Therefore the
n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator with even k is not pseudo-random since the oracle machine M exists.
Theorem 4.2.2. If k is odd, then a 2k rounds n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator is not pseudo-random.
Proof. To prove that a 2k rounds n:kn-UFN2 is not pseudo-random, we show that there is a relation between
the input and output of oracle queries. Next, we build an oracle machine that can distinguish an n:kn-UFN2
permutation generator and an ideal permutation generator by using this relation.
From the definition of an n:kn-UFN2, we obtain the following equation
L2k1 ⊕·· ·⊕L2kk ⊕R2k
= (L2k−11 ⊕·· ·⊕L2k−1k ⊕R2k−1)⊕ f2k(R2k−1))
...
= (L01⊕·· ·L0k⊕R0)⊕
2k⊕
i=1
fi(Ri−1).
In this case, R2k is represented as
R2k = R2k−(k+1)⊕ ( fk+1(Rk)⊕·· ·⊕ f2k(R2k−1))
...
=W ⊕
2k⊕
i=1
fi(Ri−1)⊕ fk(Rk−1)
where W is defined as
W =
{
L0i if 3(r+1) mod (k+1) = i−1,
R0 if 3(r+1) mod (k+1) = k.
Thus, we obtain the following relation between the input and output of an n:kn-UFN2 as
(L2k1 ⊕·· ·⊕L2kk )⊕ (L01⊕·· ·⊕L0k⊕R0)⊕W = fk(Rk−1).
If we choose two oracle queries with different L0p,1 and L
0
q,1 blocks for the indexes p and q with 1≤ p< q≤
m, then we obtain the following equations
(L2kp,1⊕·· ·⊕L2kp,k)⊕ (L0p,1⊕L02⊕·· ·⊕L0k⊕R0)⊕Wp = fk(Rk−1),
(L2kq,1⊕·· ·⊕L2kq,k)⊕ (L0q,1⊕L02⊕·· ·⊕L0k⊕R0)⊕Wq = fk(Rk−1).
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By using these two equations, we have the following relation for two oracle queries and their responses as
(L2kp,1⊕·· ·⊕L2kp,k)⊕ (L2kq,1⊕·· ·⊕L2kq,k)⊕ (L0p,1⊕L0q,1)⊕ (Wp⊕Wq) = 0.
An oracle machine M that distinguishes between an n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator and an ideal
random permutation generator can be built as follows. First, the oracle machine queries xp and xq and
receives responses yp and yq. If the equation (L2kp,1⊕·· ·⊕L2kp,k)⊕ (L2kq,1⊕·· ·⊕L2kq,k)⊕ (L0p,1⊕L0q,1)⊕ (Wp⊕
Wq) = 0 is satisfied, then the oracle machine outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0. Thus, if the oracle response
is generated by the n:kn-UFN2, then the output of the oracle machine is always 1. However, if the oracle
response is generated by the ideal random permutation generator, then the probability that the equation is
satisfied is 1/2n. Therefore the n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator is not pseudo-random since the oracle
machine M can distinguish two permutation generators.
We now prove that a 2k+1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator using pseudo-random functions is
pseudo-random. First, we define an event that can be used to distinguish a 2k+1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 using
ideal random functions from an ideal random permutation generator as the following BAD event.
Definition 4.2.1. (The BAD event ξ of 2k+ 1 rounds n:kn-UFN2) A random variable ξ i is defined as an
event in which Rip and R
i
q of two oracle query indexes p and q are equal where 1 ≤ p < q ≤ m. The BAD
event ξ is a random variable defined as ∨2ki=kξ i.
If an oracle machine is able to distinguish between a 2k+ 1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 and an ideal random
permutation generator, then the BAD event must occur. This means that if the BAD event does not occur,
then the 2k+ 1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 is equal to an ideal random permutation generator. In the following
lemma, we prove it.
Lemma 4.2.3. A 2k+1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator using an ideal random function generator
is equal to an ideal random permutation generator if k is odd and the BAD event does not occur. That is, for
all possible σ1,σ2, . . . ,σm ∈ {0,1}(k+1)n, we have
Pr(∧mi=1(yi = σi)|¬ξ ) = 1/2(k+1)nm
where yi is the output of the 2k+1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator.
Proof. If the response yp of the oracle query xp is generated by an n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator, then
the oracle response is calculated by the following algorithm. In this case, xp = (L0p,1‖L0p,2‖· · ·‖L0p,k‖R0p) and
yp = (L2k+1p,1 ‖L2k+1p,2 ‖· · ·‖L2k+1p,k ‖R2k+1p ).
input (L0p,1‖L0p,2‖· · ·‖L0p,k‖R0p)
select h1p,h
2
p, . . . ,h
2k+1
p ∈ uniform distribution
for 1≤ i≤ 2k+1 do
`← min q : 1≤ q≤ p and Ri−1q = Ri−1p
Lip,1← Ri−1p
Lip,2← Li−1p,1 ⊕hi`
...
29
Lip,k← Li−1p,k−1⊕hi`
Rip← Li−1p,k ⊕hi`
end for
output (L2k+1p,1 ‖L2k+1p,2 ‖· · ·‖L2k+1p,k ‖R2k+1p ).
By using this algorithm, the oracle response yp can be represented by hkp,h
k+1
p , . . . ,h
2k+1
p and the intermediate
value (Lk−1p,1 ‖Lk−1p,2 ‖· · ·‖Lk−1p,k ‖Rk−1p ) that is used in the algorithm as follows.
Lk−1p,1
Lk−1p,2
Lk−1p,3
· · ·
Lk−1p,k−1
Lk−1p,k
Rk−1p

⊕

1 1 1 · · · 1 1 0
1 1 1 · · · 1 0 1
1 1 1 · · · 0 1 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 1 0 · · · 1 1 1
1 0 1 · · · 1 1 1
0 1 1 · · · 1 1 1


hkp
hk+1p
hk+2p
· · ·
h2k−1p
h2kp
h2k+1p

=

L2k+1p,1
L2k+1p,2
L2k+1p,3
· · ·
L2k+1p,k−1
L2k+1p,k
R2k+1p

.
Let yk−1 = (Lk−1p,1 , · · · ,Lk−1p,k ,Rk−1p ), y2k+1 = (L2k+1p,1 , · · · ,L2k+1p,k ,R2k+1p ), and x = (hkp,hk+1p , · · · ,h2k+1p ) be col-
umn vectors. Let A be a (k+ 1)× (k+ 1) matrix in which only the elements Ai,k+2−i are 0 and the other
elements are 1. Then the above equation can be represented as a linear relation yk−1⊕ Ax = y2k+1. If
we let y = yk−1⊕ y2k+1, then the linear relation can be represented as Ax = y. This is equal to a function
T : I(k+1)n→ I(k+1)n such that T (x) = Ax.
Now, we show that the output y of T (x) = Ax has a uniform probability distribution. The value x has
a uniform probability distribution since the n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator uses ideal random functions.
That is, the probability that xi is chosen in I(k+1)n is 1/2(k+1)n. Therefore, if the function T is a one-to-one
correspondence function, then the output yi value of the function T also has a probability value 1/2(k+1)n
equal to xi. If the function T is a one-to-one function, then T is a one-to-one correspondence function since
the domain and region of T are the same.
If the function T (x) = y is a one-to-one correspondence, then the inverse of T must exist. That is, the
inverse matrix A−1 of the matrix A must exist since T (x) = Ax. If the determinant of A is not zero, then there
exists an inverse matrix. So we should show that det(A) 6= 0.
In order to show that the determinant of the square matrix A is not zero, we convert A to an echelon form
A′. At this time, only row addition and row interchange are used. If the echelon form A′ contains a row of
zero, then det(A) = 0, otherwise det(A) 6= 0 [10]. Thus, we should show that A′ does not contain a row of
zero.
First, we select an element in (1,1) as the first pivot element and perform row addition. Then we have
the following matrix. We also select an element in (i,k+2− i) as ith pivot element for 2≤ i≤ k.
1 1 1 · · · 1 1 0
1 1
O 1 1
. .
.
1 O 1
1 1
0 1 1 · · · 1 1 1

.
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The above matrix contains pivot elements for all columns except the k+1 column. Therefore, the element
at position (k+ 1,k+ 1) should be selected as the k+ 1th pivot. To do so, all values except the k+ 1th
element of the k+1th row vector must be set to zero. Let ri be the ith row vector of the above matrix. The
k+1th pivotal element is obtained by performing row addition r2⊕ r3⊕·· ·⊕ rk⊕ rk+1. By the property of
the XOR operation, the result of row addition is (0,0, . . . ,0,0,X), where X = 0 if k is even and X = 1 if k is
odd depending on the property of the XOR. An echelon form A′ is obtained by performing row exchange so
that each pivot is located diagonally in the matrix.
Thus, when k is an odd number, the echelon form matrix A′ does not include a row of zero. Therefore,
if k is odd, the output of 2k+1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 has a uniform probability distribution.
Lemma 4.2.4. The probability of the BAD event in a 2k+ 1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator is
bounded by
Pr(ξ )≤ (k+1)m2/2n+1.
Proof. For the proof, we should show that Pr(ξ i)≤ m2/2n+1 since Pr(ξ ) = ∨2ki=k Pr(ξ i) by the definition of
the BAD event ξ .
By the definition of ξ i, we have Pr(ξ i) = Pr(Rip = Riq) for the oracle query indexes p and q with 1≤ p<
q≤ m. Thus we obtain the following equation
Pr(Rip = R
i
q) =
{
Pr(Li−1p,k ‖Ri−1p = Li−1q,k ‖Ri−1q ) if Li−1p,k ‖Ri−1p = Li−1q,k ‖Ri−1q
1/2n otherwise.
Similarly, we can obtain the following equation
Pr(Li− jp,k− j+1‖· · ·‖Ri− jp = Li− jq,k− j+1‖· · ·‖Ri− jq )
=
{
Pr(Li− j−1p,k− j ‖· · ·‖Ri− j−1p = Lk− jq,i ‖· · ·‖Ri− jq ) if Li− j−1p,k− j ‖· · ·‖Ri− j−1p = Li− j−1q,k− j ‖· · ·‖Ri− j−1q
1/2( j+i)n otherwise
Since each oracle query should be different, we have Pr(L0p,1‖· · ·‖L0p,k‖R0p = L0q,1‖· · ·‖L0q,k‖R0q) = 0 for
oracle query indexes p and q with 1≤ p< q≤ m. Thus, we have
Pr(ξ i) = mC2 ·Pr(Rip = Riq)
= mC2
(
1
2n
+ · · ·+ 1
2kn
+(i− k) 1
2(k+1)n
)
≤ m
2
2n+1
.
Therefore, we have Pr(ξ ) = ∑2ki=k m2/2n+1 = (k+1)m2/2n+1.
In Theorem 4.2.5, we prove that a 2k+1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 that uses ideal random functions is pseudo-
random from the above two lemmas, and we also prove that a 2k+ 1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 that uses pseudo-
random functions is also pseudo-random.
Theorem 4.2.5. A 2k+1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator using a pseudo-random function gen-
erator is a pseudo-random permutation generator.
Proof. From Lemma 4.2.3 and Lemma 4.2.4, we can show that an n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator P
that uses an ideal random function generator is a pseudo-random permutation generator. First, we have
|Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1|¬ξ )−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) = 1)| = 0 since P is the same as an ideal random permutation
generator K when the BAD event ξ does not occur by Lemma 4.2.3. We also have |Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1|ξ )−
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Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) = 1)| ≤ 1 since the absolute value of the probability difference is less than 1. Therefore, we
have the following equation∣∣Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1)−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) = 1)∣∣
=
∣∣Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1|ξ )−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) = 1)∣∣ ·Pr(ξ )+∣∣Pr(MP(1(k+1)n) = 1|¬ξ )−Pr(MK(1(k+1)n) = 1)∣∣ ·Pr(¬ξ )
≤ Pr(ξ )≤ (k+1)m2/2n+1.
We now show that a 2k+1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator P using a pseudo-random function
generator is a pseudo-random permutation generator. For this, we use the proof by contradiction. That
is, if a 2k+ 1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 using an ideal random function generator is pseudo-random but a 2k+ 1
rounds n:kn-UFN2 using a pseudo-random function generator is not pseudo-random, then we can derive a
contradiction to the pseudo-randomness of the pseudo-random function generator.
Suppose that an n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator P using a pseudo-random function generator is not
pseudo-random. Then there exists an oracle machine M which distinguishes an ideal random permutation
generator K and P with a probability greater than 1/nc for a constant c.
First, we let D f2k+1 ◦ · · · ◦D fi+1 ◦Dhi ◦ · · · ◦Dh1(·) be a permutation generator in which an ideal random
function generator is used from the first round to the ith round and a pseudo-random function generator
is used from the i+ 1th round to the 2k+ 1th round in an n:kn-UFN2 permutation generator for i with
0≤ i≤ 2k+1. Let pDi be the probability that an oracle machine that has access to this permutation generator
will output 1. That is,
pDi = Pr(M
D f2k+1◦···◦D fi+1◦Dhi◦···◦Dh1 (1(k+1)n) = 1)
where fi+1, . . . , f2k+1 are functions generated by a pseudo-random function generator and h1, . . . ,hi are func-
tions generated by an ideal random function generator. Let pK be the probability that an oracle machine that
has access to the ideal random permutation generator will output 1. Since we supposed that the 2k+ 1
rounds n:kn-UFN2 using a pseudo-random function generator is not pseudo-random, we get the following
equation
1/nc ≤ |pK− pD0 |
≤ |pK− pD2k+1|+ |pD2k+1− pD2k|+ · · ·+ |pDi+1− pDi |+ · · ·+ |pD1 − pD0 |.
However, since the 2k+1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 using an ideal random function generator has been shown
to be a pseudo-random permutation generator, we have |PK−PD2k+1| ≤ (k+1)m2/2n+1. Therefore, we have
|pDi+1− pDi | ≥ 1/(2k+2)nc for some i. By using this, an oracle machine C that distinguishes an ideal random
function generator and a pseudo-random function generator with a probability higher than 1/(2k+2)nc can
be constructed as follows.
In the oracle machine C, we first change the part of C that calculates the oracle query reply to D f2k+1 ◦
· · · ◦D fi+1 ◦DX ◦Dhi−1 ◦ · · · ◦Dh1(·). In this case, X is a function whose input is n bits and whose output
is n bits. If X in C is a function generated by a pseudo-random function generator F , then we have pDi =
Pr(CF(1kn) = 1). On the other hand, if X in C is a function generated by an ideal random function generator
H, then we have pDi+1 = Pr(C
H(1kn) = 1). However, it is possible to distinguish the ideal random function
generator and the pseudo-random function generator with a probability greater than 1/(2k + 2)nc since
|pDi+1 − pDi | ≥ 1/(2k+ 2)nc. But this contradicts that the pseudo-random function generator is pseudo-
random. Therefore, the 2k+ 1 rounds n:kn-UFN2 using a pseudo-random function generator is a pseudo-
random permutation generator.
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Chapter 5
Comparison of Unbalanced Feistel
Networks
In this chapter, we compare the amount of memory required for implementation and the time of a pseudo-
random permutation generator when implementing the pseudo-random permutation generator using a bal-
anced Feistel network, unbalanced Feistel networks, and the newly proposed Feistel network.
To implement a pseudo-random permutation generator, we must implement a pseudo-random function
used in a Feistel network. However, the implementation cost of the pseudo-random function and the speed of
the pseudo-random function greatly affect the cost and speed of the Feistel network. Therefore, depending
on how to implement the pseudo-random function, the comparison value can vary greatly. Therefore, in this
chapter, we will compare the method that can most simply implement the pseudo-random function and the
method that uses the GGM pseudo-random function generator. In other words, the cost and the execution
speed of each pseudo-random permutation generator are investigated by using these two methods.
5.1 Using Memory and Pseudo-Random Bit Generator
The simplest way to implement a pseudo-random function is to use memory and a pseudo-random bit gen-
erator. That is, if the input value x of a function is given, the output value y is calculated by using a pseudo-
random bit generator. At this time, the initial value of the pseudo-random bit generator uses an ideal random
value such as coin tosses. However, a pseudo-random function must give the same output value for the same
input value. Thus, the input value and the output value are stored in memory. That is, given the same input
value as before, the output is obtained by referring to the memory instead of using the pseudo-random bit
generator.
Before describing this algorithm, we assume that the size of the key that specifies a pseudo-random
function used in the ith round of a Feistel network is ` bits. We also assume that the input of a pseudo-
random bit generator G is ` bits and the output is P2 bit. That is, G : I`→ IP2 . An algorithm that implements
a pseudo-random function Fki : IP1 → IP2 whose input is P1 bits and output is P2 bits is as follows.
Since the input of the pseudo-random function is P1 bits and the output is P2 bits, the amount of memory
required to implement a pseudo-random function is 2P1P2 bits. Therefore, an r rounds Feistel network using
pseudo-random functions requires r ·2P1P2 bits memory. The time to calculate the output value of a pseudo-
random function is proportional to the time to calculate the output of a pseudo-random bit generator. Thus,
the execution time of a pseudo-random function whose output is P2 bits is proportional to the P2 value of the
output size. Therefore, the execution time of the r rounds Feistel network is proportional to r ·P2 value.
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Algorithm 1 Calculate y = Fki(x)
Require: |x|= P1 and |y|= P2
Ensure: y = Fki(x)
1: procedure
2: if mem[i][x] = null then
3: generate`−bit string s using coin-toss.
4: mem[i][x]← G(s).
5: y← mem[i][x].
Table 5.1: Comparison of PRPs using memory and pseudo-random bit generators
Balanced Unbalanced Feistel network Proposed structure
Feistel network kn:n-UFN n:kn-UFN n:kn-UFN2
Number of rounds 3 k+2 k+2 2k+1
Memory size 2(k+1)n/2kn 2knkn 2nk2n 2nkn
Relative ratio 2(k−1)n/2 2(k−1)n k 1
Running time 1.5kn kn k2n 2kn
Relative ratio 1.5 1 k 2
In case of implementing a pseudo-random function by using the algorithm 1, the memory size required
for each pseudo-random permutation generator and the execution time of each Feistel network are shown
in Table 5.1. In the total memory size, the pseudo-random permutation generator using a newly proposed
structure (n:kn-UFN2) requires the least memory and the pseudo-random permutation generator using a
source-heavy unbalanced Feistel network (kn:n-UFN) requires the most memory. In the execution time
of the whole Feistel network, the pseudo-random permutation generator using a source-heavy unbalanced
Feistel network (kn:n-UFN) is the fastest and the pseudo-random permutation generator using a target-heavy
unbalanced Feistel network (n:kn-UFN) is the slowest.
5.2 Using the GGM Pseudo-Random Function
Another way to implement a pseudo-random function is to use the pseudo-random function generator of
Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali. A major advantage of the GGM pseudo-random function generator is
that it can implement a pseudo-random function without storing previously generated pseudo-random bits.
Let ` be the size of the entire key of a pseudo-random permutation generator. Then the ith pseudo-
random function of the pseudo-random permutation generator from an r rounds Feistel network will use `/r
bits of the key. We first prepare two pseudo-random bit generators G : I`/r→ I2`/r and G′ : I`/r→ IP2 . Let G0
be the first `/r bits of G, and G1 be the next `/r bits of G. A pseudo-random function F : IP1 → IP2 whose
the key size is `/r is defined by the following algorithm.
Since the pseudo-random bits that are previously generated by the algorithm can not be stored, the
amount of memory required is fixed. By analyzing the above algorithm, the number of pseudo-random bits
that the algorithm must generate to compute one pseudo-random permutation is maximum (2P1`/r+P2)r
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Algorithm 2 Calculate y = Fki(x)
Require: |x|= P1, |ki|= `/r, and |y|= P2
Ensure: y = Fki(x)
1: procedure
2: for 1≤ j ≤ P1 do
3: if x[ j] = 0 then
4: T ← G0(ki).
5: else
6: T ← G1(ki).
7: y← G′(T ).
Table 5.2: Comparison of PRPs using the GGM pseudo-random function generator
Balanced Unbalanced Feistel network Proposed structure
Feistel network kn:n-UFN n:kn-UFN n:kn-UFN2
Number of rounds 3 k+2 k+2 2k+1
Memory size - - - -
Relative ratio - - - -
Running time kn` 2kn` 2n` 2n`
Relative ratio k 2k 2 2
bits. Therefore, the memory size and the time of each Feistel network are shown in Table 5.2.
It can be seen that the pseudo-random permutation generator using a target-heavy (n:kn-UFN) and the
proposed structure (n:kn-UFN2) is the fastest in the execution time of the entire Feistel network. On the
other hand, it can be seen that the pseudo-random permutation generator using a source-heavy (kn:n-UFN)
is the slowest.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the minimum number of rounds for a block cipher from unbalanced Feistel net-
works to be a pseudo-random permutation generator which is a safe and efficient block cipher. We also
propose a new unbalanced Feistel network structure that can be extended and analyze the minimum number
of rounds for this structure to be a pseudo-random permutation generator.
The minimum number of rounds for a permutation generator from unbalanced Feistel networks to be a
pseudo-random permutation generator is as follows.
• In case of a source-heavy unbalanced Feistel network where the source block is kn bits and the target
block is n bits: If pseudo-random functions are used in round functions and the total number of rounds
is k+ 2 or more, then a source-heavy unbalanced Feistel network is a pseudo-random permutation
generator.
• In case of a target-heavy unbalanced Feistel network where the source-block is n bits and the tar-
get block is kn bits: If pseudo-random functions are used in round functions and the total number
of rounds is more than k+ 2, then a target-heavy unbalanced Feistel network is a pseudo-random
permutation generator.
A newly proposed architecture is an unbalanced Feistel network architecture that can extend an n-bit block
cipher to a (k+1)n-bit block cipher. The minimum number of rounds of a permutation generator from this
structure to be pseudo-random is as follows.
• If k is even, then a newly proposed structure is not a pseudo-random permutation generator.
• If k is odd, pseudo-random functions are used, and the total number of rounds is 2k+1 or more, then
a newly proposed structure is a pseudo-random permutation generator.
In all three structures, the probability that an arbitrary algorithm can distinguish between an ideal random
permutation generator and a pseudo-random permutation generator is less than m2/2n after obtaining m
plaintext and ciphertext pairs. Therefore, when a block cipher is implemented using an unbalanced Feistel
network structure, it can be a safe and efficient block cipher only if the number of rounds shown in this
paper is satisfied.
In this paper, we examined only the condition of the number of rounds for an unbalanced Feistel network
using pseudo-random functions to be pseudo-random. If a permutation generator from an unbalanced Feistel
network is a super pseudo-random permutation, it becomes a secure block cipher for both chosen plaintext
and chosen ciphertext attacks. Therefore, in the future, it is necessary to analyze the condition of the round
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number for a block cipher from an unbalanced Feistel network to be the super pseudo-random permutation
generator.
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